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“ANOTHER DAY” HAS DAWNED: THE MAINE 
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT HOLDS LABORATORY 
REPORTS SUBJECT TO THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE IN STATE V. MANGOS 
Reid Hayton-Hull* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants 
the right to “confront witnesses against them.”1  Specifically, the Clause ensures a 
criminal defendant’s right to confront witnesses who testify against him by the 
unique medium, or “crucible,” of cross-examination.2  Although federal and state 
rules of evidence prohibiting hearsay and the Confrontation Clause are designed to 
protect similar interests,3 whether or not admission of a piece of evidence violates a 
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause is a separate analysis than 
whether that same piece of evidence is admissible under a rule of evidence.4  In 
2004, the United States Supreme Court held in Crawford v. Washington that the 
Confrontation Clause applies only to “testimonial” statements.5  However, the 
Court left “for another day” the creation of a comprehensive definition of 
“testimonial.”6  “One of the most difficult issues presented” by Crawford is 
whether forensic laboratory reports are “testimonial” for the purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause.7  Although forensic laboratory reports are widely admitted at 
criminal trials in lieu of live testimony from the technicians who prepared the 
reports,8 the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet addressed this issue.  
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, however, recently 
addressed this issue in State v. Mangos and held that forensic lab reports are 
“testimonial.”9  The Supreme Court of the United States is currently reviewing this 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author would like to thank her 
husband, Nathaniel R. Hull, Esq., and her family in Seattle, Chicago, and Maine for their support, 
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Editor’s Note: This Case Note was written prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz, as 
explained in Part VII, infra. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 
(1970)). 
 4. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
 5. Id. at 51. 
 6. Id. at 68. 
 7. Craig M. Bradley, Confronting Scientific Tests, 44 TRIAL 56, 56 (2008). 
 8. For example, “[f]orty-two states and the District of Columbia have statutes allowing the 
introduction of forensic [drug] lab reports in lieu of live testimony.”  Brief of the States Alabama et al. 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 
(2009) (No. 07-591) (hereinafter “Brief of the States”). 
 9. 2008 ME 150, 957 A.2d 89. 
2010] STATE V. MANGOS 309 
issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.10 
The Supreme Court should follow the Law Court’s reasoning and hold forensic 
laboratory reports to be testimonial.  Although forensic laboratory reports were 
plainly not within the contemplation of the Founders as they drafted the 
Constitution, laboratory reports, which amount to statements made by laboratory 
technicians at the behest of law enforcement and in preparation for litigation, are 
precisely the type of statements that the Confrontation Clause was designed to 
address.11  In light of the weight jurors assign to forensic laboratory evidence12 and 
the results of a recent study conducted by the National Academy of Sciences, 
which reveals the abysmal state of state forensic laboratories,13 it is imperative that 
the Supreme Court follow the Law Court in holding forensic laboratory results to 
be testimonial and, therefore, subject to the Confrontation Clause.  
II.  THE FEDERAL LANDSCAPE 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment,14 provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”15  The Confrontation Clause, as envisioned by the 
Founders, has its roots in English common law.16  In sixteenth-century England, 
under the reign of Queen Mary, Marian statutes “required justices of the peace to 
examine suspects and witnesses in felony cases,” and records of such examinations 
were sometimes certified by justices of the peace and then “read in court in lieu of 
live testimony.”17  The Marian statutes were replaced “[t]hrough a series of 
statutory and judicial reforms,” and “the English law developed a right of 
confrontation,” 18 which mandated that the defendant have the opportunity to 
examine witnesses through the “open” means of cross-examination.19  It was this 
common law concept that the members of the first Congress incorporated into the 
                                                                                                     
 10. For the purposes of this Note, the category of “forensic laboratory reports” at issue includes, 
among other things, both DNA and drug analyses conducted by state forensic laboratories. 
 11. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.  
 12. See Brooke G. Malcom, Convictions Predicated on DNA Evidence Alone: How Reliable 
Evidence Became Infallible, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 313, 324-25 (2008). 
 13. Editorial, Crime Scene Imperfections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at A20 (finding the field of 
forensic science “grossly deficient”). 
 14. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965)).  See also 
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (“We decide today that the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment is applicable to the States.”). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
 17. Id. at 43-44. 
 18. Id. at 44. 
 19. Id. at 61-62 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *373) (“This open examination 
of witnesses . . . is much more conducive to the clearing up of the truth.”).  See also Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (The Clause envisions “a personal examination and cross-
examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection 
and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in 
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he 
gives testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”). Id. 
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Sixth Amendment.20 
Looking to “interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the 
time it was adopted,”21 the Supreme Court stated in dicta in Mattox v. United 
States, a late nineteenth-century case, that the Confrontation Clause “however 
beneficent in [its] operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give 
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”22  In support 
of its proposition, the Mattox Court cited the dying declaration exception, which 
was “recognized long before the adoption of the Constitution” and which exists “to 
prevent a manifest failure of justice.”23 
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that, read literally, the 
Confrontation Clause “would require, on objection, the exclusion of any statement 
made by a declarant not present at trial.”24  However, the Court has also recognized 
legitimate “competing interests,” such as public policy and the necessities of the 
case, which require a less stringent reading of the Confrontation Clause.25  In Ohio 
v. Roberts, the Supreme Court rejected a strict reading of the Clause on the grounds 
that such a reading “would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception,” a result 
which was “unintended and too extreme.”26  Drawing on several cases in which the 
Court “ha[d] sought to accommodate . . . competing interests,”27 the Roberts Court 
formulated a framework for analysis of alleged Confrontation Clause violations.  
The Roberts Court provided for the admission of a declarant’s prior statements, 
where that declarant was unavailable to be cross-examined at trial, if the statements 
bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”28  “Indicia of reliability” can be inferred 
principally, though not exclusively, “where the evidence falls within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception.”29  Reasoning that “hearsay rules and the Confrontation 
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,”30 the Roberts Court 
concluded that “firmly rooted” hearsay exceptions provided sufficient safeguards 
for criminal defendants’ rights under the Confrontation Clause.31 
Roberts remained valid precedent, relied upon at both the federal and state 
levels,32 for more than twenty years.  With the Court’s holding in Crawford v. 
Washington, however, the landscape of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was 
                                                                                                     
 20. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49. 
 21. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 (defendant’s right to confront at his second trial was not violated by the 
admission of transcripts of deceased witnesses’ testimony from the defendant’s first trial, at which 
defendant had cross-examined the witnesses). 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 243-44. 
 24. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).  
 25. Id. at 64 (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243). 
 26. Id. at 63. 
 27. Id. at 64 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring); 
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243). 
 28. Id. at 66. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 155). 
 31. See id. at 66. 
 32. See, e.g. State v. Morin, 598 A.2d 170, 172 (Me. 1991) (admission of certificate and letter from 
the Secretary of State using the public records hearsay exception did not violate the Confrontation 
Clause because the public records were “inherently trustworthy”).  See also RICHARD H. FIELD & PETER 
L. MURRAY, MAINE EVIDENCE 455 (6th ed. 2007). 
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altered dramatically.  Overruling Roberts, the Supreme Court held in Crawford that 
“[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [are admissible] only where 
the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.”33  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Scalia focused his opinion on the historic origins of the Confrontation Clause in 
order to glean the Framers’ intent in including the Clause in the Sixth Amendment.  
Contrary to the Roberts Court’s call for pragmatic compromise,34 the Crawford 
Court inferred that, aside from those hearsay exceptions that were acknowledged at 
the time of the country’s founding,35 “[w]here testimonial statements are involved, 
[the Framers did not mean] to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the 
vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to the amorphous notions of 
‘reliability.’”36  Drawing on his historical analysis, Justice Scalia determined that 
the Clause “reflects an especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court 
statement,”37 namely testimonial38 “ex parte examinations as evidence against the 
accused.”39  Acknowledging that “[v]arious formulations of this core class of 
‘testimonial’ statements exists,” the Court limited its holding to “ex parte in-court 
testimony or its functional equivalent”40 and to “similar pretrial statements that 
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.”41  The Crawford 
Court “le[ft] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 
‘testimonial.’”42 As the concurrence predicted, Crawford “cast[] a mantle of 
uncertainty over future criminal trials.”43 
In Davis v. Washington,44 decided in conjunction with Hammon v. Indiana,45 
the Court attempted to define the “perimeter” of the Crawford Court’s formulation 
of  “testimonial” statements.46  Justice Scalia, again writing for the Court, set out to 
“determine when statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call 
or at a crime scene are ‘testimonial’ and thus subject to the requirements of the 
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.”47  The Court held that:  
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 
                                                                                                     
 33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added).  
 34. Id. at 60 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). 
 35. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (noting the exception of dying declarations).  
 36. Id. at 61.  The Court further stated that the Confrontation Clause “is a procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a 
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”  Id. at 61. 
 37. Id. at 51. 
 38. “‘Testimony’ . . . is typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.’”  Id. (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).   
 39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
 40. Id. at 51 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 68.  “Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”  Id. 
 43. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist C.J., concurring). 
 44. 547 U.S. 813 (2006), aff’d State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005). 
 45. 547 U.S. 813 (2006), rev’d Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). These cases are 
known collectively as Davis v. Washington. 
 46. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823-24. 
 47. Id. at 817. 
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under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They 
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.48 
The Court went on to clarify that, in order to determine what is “testimonial” for 
the purposes of the Confrontation Clause, the critical factor is the nature of the 
statement, not that of the speaker.49  Distinguishing between the two cases at hand, 
the Court determined that, because the victim in Davis placed her 911 call during 
the course of an incident of domestic violence,50 the purpose of the victim’s call 
was to “describe current circumstances . . . as they were actually  happening . . . to 
be able to resolve the present emergency.”51  Because the victim’s primary purpose 
was to resolve a present emergency, “she simply was not acting as a witness; she 
was not testifying.”52  Therefore, her statements to the 911 operator53 were not 
testimonial and thus were not subject to the requirements of the Confrontation 
Clause. 
In contrast to the statements made by the victim in Davis, the statements at 
issue in Hammon,54 which were admitted at trial, were made by a victim of 
domestic violence after the police, in response to a 911 call, had arrived on the 
scene and the incident had ended.55  After responding to the officers’ questions, the 
victim filled out and signed an affidavit, which the prosecution successfully 
introduced at trial.56  Explaining that statements made in an effort to resolve a 
present emergency can “evolve into testimonial statements,”57 the Court 
determined that because the emergency was no longer in progress, the victim’s 
statements made to officers, recorded in her affidavit, were testimonial.58  Her 
statements “under official interrogation [were] an obvious substitute for live 
testimony, because they [did] precisely what a witness does on direct 
                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 822. 
 49. Id. at 821.  “Only statements of this sort cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning 
of the Confrontation Clause.”  Id.  
 50. In response to concerns cited by Respondents and amici about the susceptibility of domestic 
violence victims to intimidation or coercion at the hands of their abusers, and therefore the effect of the 
Court’s ruling to exclude testimonial evidence where the victim is likely to be intimidated into not 
testifying, the Court “reiterate[ed] what [it] said in Crawford: that ‘the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing . 
. . extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.”  Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (quoting 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62).  
 51. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.  This is true even of statements regarding the identity of the assailant, 
“so that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon.”  Id.  
 52. Id. at 828. 
 53. For the purposes of resolving the issue, the Court was careful to note that “[i]f 911 operators are 
not themselves law enforcement officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they 
conduct interrogations of 911 callers.  For purposes of this opinion (and without deciding the point), we 
consider their acts to be acts of the police.”  Id. at 823 n.2. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 819-20. 
 56. Id. at 820. 
 57. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (quoting Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 457). 
 58. Id. at 829-30. 
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examination.”59  Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Indiana.60  
III.  THE STATE OF “TESTIMONIAL” IN MAINE 
The new Crawford framework represented a dramatic change in Confrontation 
Clause analysis in Maine.61  In the wake of Crawford, Maine grappled, as did other 
states, to fill the holes left in the Supreme Court’s decision.  Recognizing that the 
application of Crawford would “require detailed attention to the specific facts in 
each case,”62 the Law Court’s first opportunity to apply Crawford arose in 2004 in 
State v. Gorman.63  In a fairly straightforward application of Crawford, the Law 
Court held that grand jury testimony was “testimonial” for the purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause.64   
Filling in the holes that would later be addressed by the Supreme Court in 
Davis, the Law Court next addressed the contours of Crawford’s definition of 
“testimonial” in State v. Barnes.65  Barnes was found guilty of murdering his 
mother and appealed his conviction to the Law Court.66  The Law Court affirmed 
his conviction, at which point Barnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking 
the Law Court to review the trial court’s admission into evidence of statements 
made by his mother to a police officer shortly before her death.67  The jury heard a 
police officer testify that Barnes’s mother had driven herself to a police station in a 
state of distress, and that once inside the station, Barnes’s mother told officers that 
her son had assaulted her and threatened to kill her.68  Foreshadowing the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Davis, the Law Court held that the trial court did not commit 
error with its admission of Barnes’s mother’s statements because her statements 
were not “testimonial.”69  The Law Court reasoned that her statements were not 
given during a “police interrogation” because they were made when Barnes’s 
mother was “still under the stress of the alleged assault” and “seeking safety and 
aid.”70 
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its holding in Davis, the Law Court 
issued a very brief opinion in the case of State v. Bennett.71  Bennett was convicted 
by a jury of elevated aggravated assault, robbery, and unauthorized use of 
property.72  At trial, the judge had permitted the jury to hear a recording of the 
victim’s 911 call, made just after he was brutally attacked by Bennett.73  Without 
                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 830. 
 60. Id. at 834.  
 61. See Morin, 598 A.2d at 172. 
 62. State v. Barnes, 2004 ME 105, ¶ 10, 854 A.2d 208, 212. 
 63. 2004 ME 90, 854 A.2d 1164. 
 64. Id. ¶ 55, 854 A.2d at 1178.  
 65. 2004 ME 105, 854 A.2d 208.  
 66. Id. ¶ 1, 854 A.2d at 209.  
 67. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 854 A.2d at 209 (admitted under the excited utterance hearsay exception). 
 68. Id. ¶ 3, 854 A.2d at 209. 
 69. Id. ¶ 11, 854 A.2d at 211-12. 
 70. Id. 
 71. 2006 ME 103, 903 A.2d 853. 
 72. Id. ¶ 1, 903 A.2d at 854.  
 73. Id. ¶ 8, 903 A.2d at 855.  
314 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
spelling out its own reasoning, the Law Court simply cited Davis and held that 
“admitting the tape did not violate the Confrontation Clause.”74 
The Law Court held in State v. Ahmed that a trial court did not commit error by 
admitting, for the purposes of evaluating credibility, a domestic violence victim’s 
statements made during a 911 call.75  The Law Court hinted with a footnote that 
although the victim refused to testify at trial, Ahmed’s rights under the 
Confrontation Clause would not have been violated because the 911 call was made 
“for the purpose of resolving a present emergency,” and therefore, per Davis, was 
not testimonial.76 
In State v. Roberts, the Law Court held that admission of evidence that would 
otherwise be “testimonial” did not implicate the Confrontation Clause if the 
evidence was not offered for substantive purposes.77  Roberts was found guilty of 
murdering the mother of his child78 and appealed on the grounds that his rights 
under the Confrontation Clause had been violated by the admission into evidence 
of a complaint for protection from abuse and a supporting affidavit that had been 
filed by the victim prior to her death.79  The court was not persuaded by Roberts’s 
argument because the jury was properly instructed not to use the allegations 
contained in the order or affidavit for substantive purposes.80 
Finally, in 2008, the Law Court held in State v. Tayman that a public record, 
proof of notice of license suspension generated by the Department of Motor 
Vehicles, was not “testimonial” for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.81  
The Law Court was persuaded that “the Crawford Court’s exclusion of business 
records from the definition of ‘testimonial’ provided a basis to conclude that public 
records were similarly not within the purview of Confrontation Clause analysis.”82  
The Law Court included in its holding public records that “merely reflect the 
routine cataloging of administrative events” and that “do not contain assertions or 
accusations made after the fact and in preparation for litigation,” which are not 
testimonial.83 
IV.  MAINE LEADS THE WAY: STATE V. MANGOS 
Although the “testimonial” nature of forensic laboratory reports has been “the 
most widespread subject of controversy” in the wake of Crawford,84 the Supreme 
                                                                                                     
 74. Id. ¶ 9, 903 A.2d at 856. 
 75. 2006 ME 133, ¶¶ 12-15, 909 A.2d 1011, 1016-17. 
 76. Id. at n.1 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 826-27).   
 77. 2008 ME 112, ¶ 34, 951 A.2d 803, 814.  
 78. Id. ¶¶ 1-18, 951 A.2d at 806-10. 
 79. Id. ¶ 33, 951 A.2d at 813.  
 80. Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 951 A.2d at 813-14.  The trial court told the jury not to “consider the allegations 
that appear in the 2005 complaint as evidence of anything.  They’re simply allegations.”  Id. ¶ 33, 951 
A.2d at 813.  
 81. 2008 ME 177, ¶¶ 24-25, 960 A.2d 1151, 1158.  
 82. Id. ¶ 18, 960 A.2d at 1156.  The court also looked to other state court decisions to reach its 
decision.  Id. ¶¶ 15-17, 960 A.2d at 1156 (citing State v. Shipley, 757 N.W.2d 228 (Iowa 2008); State v. 
Kronich 161 P.3d 982 (Wash. 2007); State v. Kirkpatrick, 161 P.3d 990 (Wash. 2007)).   
 83. Id. ¶ 21, 960 A.2d at 1157 (emphasis added).  
 84. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Paul C. Giannelli et al. in Support of Petioner at 1, Campbell 
v. North Dakota, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1180, (No. 05-564). 
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Court has not yet resolved the issue.  The Law Court, in State v. Mangos,85 
answered this question and held that laboratory reports were testimonial.  
In 2006, Vincent Mangos was convicted of robbing a convenience store in 
Lewiston, Maine.86  At trial, the prosecution offered into evidence a laboratory 
report, prepared by the Maine State Police Laboratory, that used DNA testing to 
link Mangos to clothing found near the crime scene.87  In order to establish the 
chain of custody, the prosecution called a laboratory supervisor to testify, based on 
the report of a laboratory technician who handled the clothing, about the process of 
taking swabs from the garments.88  Over Mangos’s objection, the laboratory 
supervisor testified in lieu of the laboratory technician.89  The supervisor admitted 
that, because she had not performed the swabbing and only had the laboratory 
technician’s report to speak from, “only [the laboratory technician] could testify as 
to whether the correct scientific method was used in creating the swabs.”90 
After being convicted of robbery, Mangos appealed to the Law Court.91  He 
argued that because the laboratory technician’s report was used to “establish both 
the factual and scientific foundation for the admission of the DNA evidence,” the 
technician was a “witness against him,” and he therefore had a right to cross-
examine her under the Confrontation Clause.92  Underestimating the strength of 
Mangos’s argument, the State argued simply that because the laboratory technician 
did not testify at trial, her report was not “testimonial,” and that the defendant’s 
right to confront was not violated because the technician’s actual report was not 
admitted into evidence, 93 without considering the fact that the laboratory 
supervisor’s testimony was based on the laboratory technician’s report.94  
The Law Court was persuaded by Mangos’s argument and vacated his 
conviction.95  The court held that the laboratory technician’s statements contained 
in her report were testimonial and therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause.96  
Citing Davis for the proposition that “[t]estimonial evidence includes statements 
made for the purpose of police investigation,” the court concluded that the 
technician’s statements were exactly that.97  Accordingly, Mangos had a right to 
cross-examine her.98  In holding that the trial court’s error was not harmless, the 
Law Court was mindful of the fact that DNA “is very powerful evidence,” and is 
                                                                                                     
 85. 2008 ME 150, 957 A.2d 89. 
 86. Id. ¶ 1, 957 A.2d at 90-91.  
 87. Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 957 A.2d at 91-92.  
 88. Id. ¶ 4, 957 A.2d at 91.  
 89. Id.   
 90. Id. ¶ 6, 957 A.2d at 92. 
 91. Mangos, 2008 ME 150, ¶ 1, 957 A.2d at 90-91. 
 92. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, State v. Mangos, 2008 ME 150, 957 A.2d 89 (No. And-07-602) 
(emphasis added).  
 93. Brief for the State, Appellee at 11, State v. Mangos, 2008 ME 150, 957 A.2d 89 (No. And-07-
602). 
 94. Mangos, 2008 ME 150, ¶ 4, 957 A.2d at 91. 
 95. Id. ¶ 1, 957 A.2d at 91. 
 96. Id. ¶ 13, 957 A.2d at 93. 
 97. Id. ¶¶ 11,13, 957 A.2d at 93 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 830). 
 98. Id. ¶ 13, 957 A.2d at 93. 
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therefore likely to have a profound impact on the jury.99 
Implicit in the court’s holding in Mangos is the conclusion that laboratory 
reports are not subject to the public records exception cited in Tayman.  The critical 
distinction between the statements made in each case is the time at which the 
statements were made.  “Assertions” made “in preparation for litigation” do not fall 
within the business or public record exception and are therefore subject to the 
Confrontation Clause. 100  As the Crawford Court explained, those statements that 
fall under the common law business record exception “by their nature [are] not 
testimonial.”101  Although the report in question in Mangos contained statements 
about the preparation of the swabs to be tested, the Mangos holding is broad and 
therefore applies similarly to the statements made “in preparation for litigation” 
contained in the report of a laboratory technician who actually conducted the 
testing and interpreted the results.102  Such statements would also fall into the 
purview of Mangos as being “in furtherance of a police investigation.”  The court’s 
holding in Mangos is uncharted territory in Maine, as evidenced by the court’s 
noticeable absence of supporting authority. 
The Law Court did not address how its holding in Mangos would interact with 
Maine’s statutes permitting admission of lab evidence via affidavit, 103 subject to a 
defendant’s request that a technician testify as to the contents of the affidavit.  
Namely, section 2431 of title 29-A permits admission into evidence of the contents 
of duly signed and sworn certificates, prepared by analysts, stating the results of 
blood-alcohol or drug concentration analysis.104  Section 2431 also includes a 
“notice-and-demand” caveat, which provides that a defendant “may request that a 
qualified witness testify to the matters of which the certificate constitutes prima 
facie evidence.”105  The statute does not demand that the witness be the person who 
actually conducted the test, mirroring the very procedure that the Law Court 
rejected in Mangos.  Similarly, section 1112 of title 17-A provides that, after 
analyzing “a drug or substance from a law enforcement officer,” a laboratory “shall 
issue a certificate stating the results of the analysis.”106  The duly signed and sworn 
certificate “is admissible in evidence” and “gives rise to a permissible inference . . . 
that the composition, quality and quantity of the drug or substance are as stated in 
the certificate.”107  However, the certificate is not automatically admissible unless 
“the defendant requests that a qualified witness testify as to the composition, 
                                                                                                     
 99. Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 957 A.2d at 93-94.  See also Jeffrey Toobin, The CSI Effect: The Truth About 
Forensic Science, THE NEW YORKER, May 7, 2007, at 30 (“In large part because of the [television] 
series’ success . . . [the] profession has acquired an air of glamour, and its practitioners an aura of 
infallibility.”). 
 100. 2008 ME 177, ¶ 21, 960 A.2d at 1157. 
 101. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
 102. This interpretation of the Law Court’s holding is further evidenced by the fact that Maine did 
not join the thirty-six states writing as amici curiae in support of Massachusetts.  See Brief of the States, 
supra note 8.  
 103. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2431 (1996 & Supp. 2008-2009). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. § 2431(2)(D) (emphasis added). 
 106. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1112(1) (2006). 
 107. Id. 
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quality and quantity.”108  After Mangos, the definition of a “qualified” witness must 
necessarily be narrowed to include only the laboratory technician who performed 
the analysis. 
The Mangos opinion is sparse and leaves questions unanswered.  This is likely 
because the Law Court knew that the United States Supreme Court had granted 
certiorari on the same issue in the case of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.109 
Because the Mangos holding is consistent with historical and Supreme Court 
precedent, as expounded on by Melendez-Diaz and his amicus curiae in their briefs, 
the Supreme Court should follow the Law Court’s reasoning. 
V.  FOLLOWING MAINE’S LEAD: MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS 
The question now before the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts is “[w]hether a state forensic analyst’s laboratory report prepared for 
use in a criminal prosecution is ‘testimonial’ evidence subject to the demands of 
the Confrontation Clause as set forth in Crawford v. Washington.”110  The 
petitioner, Luis Melendez-Diaz, was arrested in Massachusetts in 2001 on 
suspicion of drug dealing and was later charged with distributing and trafficking in 
cocaine.111  At trial, the prosecution offered, pursuant to Chapter 111, Section 13 of 
the General Laws of Massachusetts,112 certificates of laboratory reports reflecting 
the results of testing performed at the behest of the police department on the 
substances contained in plastic bags seized from a man with the petitioner and 
found in the back seat of the police cruiser in which the petitioner had been 
transported.113  The petitioner objected to the admission of the certificates absent an 
opportunity to cross-examine the analysts who prepared them, but the trial court 
overruled his objections.114  After being instructed that it was “permitted but . . . 
                                                                                                     
 108. Id. 
 109. Melendez-Diaz, 128 S.Ct. 1647 (2008). 
 110. Brief for Petitioner at i, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 111. Id. at 5-7. 
 112. Chapter 111, section 13 of the General Laws of Massachusetts, similar to Maine’s section 1112, 
provides:  
The analyst or an assistant analyst of the department [of public health] . . . shall upon 
request furnish a signed certificate, on oath, of the result of the analysis provided for in 
the preceding section to any police officer or any agent of such incorporated charitable 
organization, and the presentation of such certificate to the court by any police officer or 
agent of any such organization shall be prima facie evidence that all the requirements 
and provisions of the preceding section have been complied with.  This certificate shall 
be sworn to before a justice of the peace or notary public, and the jurat shall contain a 
statement that the subscriber is the analyst or an assistant analyst of the department.  
When properly executed, it shall be prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, 
and net weight of the narcotic or other drug, poison, medicine, or chemical analyzed or 
the net weight of any mixture containing the narcotic or other drug, poison, medicine, or 
chemical analyzed, and the court shall take judicial notice of the signature of the analyst 
or assistant analyst, and of the fact that he is such. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 13 (2003). 
 113. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 110, at 8. 
 114. Id. 
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not required to conclude that the substance was cocaine,”115 the jury found the 
petitioner guilty and he was sentenced to three years in prison.116 
The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the petitioner’s conviction.117  
The appeals court cited the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's prior holding 
in Commonwealth v. Verde that introducing “certificates of drug analysis” in lieu of 
live testimony does not “deny a defendant the right of confrontation.”118  In Verde, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that drug analysis certificates 
“had very little kinship to the type of hearsay the confrontation clause intended to 
exclude, absent an opportunity for cross-examination.”119  The Verde Court 
reasoned that drug analysis certificates “are neither discretionary nor based on 
opinion”120 and therefore were “akin to a business or official record, which the 
Court [in Crawford] stated was not testimonial in nature.”121  Melendez-Diaz then 
petitioned for, and was granted, a Writ of Certiorari by the United States Supreme 
Court.122 
Consistent with the Law Court’s holding in Mangos, Petitioner Melendez-Diaz 
contends that forensic laboratory reports are “testimonial” under Crawford, and to 
an even greater extent under Davis, and therefore are subject to the Confrontation 
Clause.  As the petitioner explains, “[A] classic form of testimonial hearsay is an ex 
parte affidavit, . . . and modern forensic laboratory certificates are the functional 
equivalent of such affidavits.”123  Because forensic reports “are expressly prepared 
for law enforcement to aid in criminal investigations . . . [they] are fundamentally 
testimonial in a way that classic business and official records were not.”124  The 
petitioner explains that the “common-law shop-book” [or business] exception and 
the “common-law hearsay exception for official (or public) records,” as envisioned 
by the Founders, was much narrower than Massachusetts would have it be,125 and 
“did not remotely encompass reports generated for use in investigations or 
litigation.”126  Indeed, were ex parte statements made in preparation for litigation 
excepted under the business or public records exception, the Confrontation Clause 
would be practically rendered moot.  As the Court extrapolated in Crawford, such 
statements were precisely what the Confrontation Clause was designed to protect 
                                                                                                     
 115. Id. at 9 n.2.   
 116. Id. at 8-9. 
 117. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 2007 WL 2189152, at *5 (Mass. App. Ct. July 31, 2007). 
 118. Id. at *4 n.3 (citing Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 704-05 (Mass. 2005)). 
 119. Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 706. 
 120. Id. at 705. 
 121. Id. at 706 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56). 
 122. Melendez-Diaz, 128 S. Ct. 1647. 
 123. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 110, at 4. 
 124. Id. at 11-12. 
 125. Id. at 20-21.  In response, Massachusetts contends that “drug analysis certificates are well within 
the common law definition official records exception because they are prepared by state officials 
pursuant to a duty imposed by law.” Brief for Respondent at 11, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 
S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 126. Id. at 20.  See also Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
13-14, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) [hereinafter Friedman 
Brief] citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943)) (“If a document is prepared for litigation, it 
is testimonial in nature whether or not the state chooses to label it a business or official record.”).  
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against.127 
In defense of the appeals court’s decision, Massachusetts contends that, more 
than the Crawford Court’s focus on “testimonial” statements, the primary focus of 
the Confrontation Clause is on “accusatory” statements.128  Under that analysis, 
because laboratory reports “reflect only . . . objective or neutral facts”129 they do 
not “implicate the ‘principle evil’ the Confrontation Clause was designed to 
avoid.”130  As the petitioner counters, however, “the Commonwealth’s ‘directly 
accusatory’ rule is startlingly restrictive,”131 and has no basis in either the text of 
the Sixth Amendment or in precedent.  Indeed, the petitioner goes on, “the phrase 
‘witnesses against’ is broader than the word ‘accusers,’132 and “[m]any criminal 
prosecutions rest entirely on circumstantial evidence, none of which ‘directly 
accuse[s] anyone of any criminal conduct.’”133 
Whether or not lab technicians are in fact law enforcement personnel, as Davis 
would suggest that they are,134 they conduct tests at the behest of, and at the 
expense of, the prosecution.  Further, laboratory technicians are unquestionably 
human.  Massachusetts contends that “the primary source of the statement is not 
even the analyst, but the machine itself.”135  This argument perpetuates a “myth of 
infallibility—a myth that finds no basis in the reality of state forensic practices 
throughout the country.”136  The Commonwealth’s argument is a fallacy and 
demonstrates a willful disregard of the human involvement that is essential to 
forensic testing.  Laboratory reports are prepared by humans and “reflect 
complicated, subjective interpretations of imprecise scientific tests.”137  
Additionally, as illustrated in Mangos, laboratory reports contain technicians’ 
accounting of the means in which samples for testing were procured and prepared.  
The inescapable human element of laboratory testing necessarily means that 
laboratory reports are fallible.  The ability to confront laboratory technician 
witnesses is even more essential in light of the statistics provided by the National 
                                                                                                     
 127. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51. 
 128. Brief for Respondent, supra note 125, at 10.  The respondent further contends that although it 
does not have case law to support this contention, “[t]he Sixth Amendment’s text itself supports an 
accusation-based focus.”  Id. at 18. 
 129. Id. at 23. 
 130. Id. at 11 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50). 
 131. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 
07-591). 
 132. Id. at 4. 
 133. Id. at 3 (quoting Brief of Respondent, supra note 125, at 16-17).  See also Friedman Brief, supra 
note 126, at 16 (“An eyewitness who is asked to do nothing more than relate what she saw is the 
paradigmatic example of a witness subject to the Clause.”).  
 134. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (noting the difference between efforts designed to establish a past 
fact and efforts to determine current circumstances requiring police assistance). 
 135. Brief for Respondent, supra note 125, at 30.  Writing as amicus curiae, the United States asserts 
that “[t]esting results that contain no human assertion are not ‘statements’ at all, and therefore cannot be 
‘testimonial statements’ for Confrontation Clause purposes.”  Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) 
[hereinafter Brief of the United States]. 
 136. Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner at 4, 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) [hereinafter Brief of National 
Innocence Network]. 
 137. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 110, at 12. 
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Innocence Network writing as amicus curiae for the petitioner.  Having discovered 
“over [100] exonerations [wherein] the misapplication of forensic disciplines . . . 
played a role in convicting the innocent,”138 the National Innocence Project posits 
that “state forensic examiners do exercise substantial discretion and judgment . . . 
and these examiners also often interpret the results of unverified techniques for 
which there often exists no recognized or objective standard at all.”139  Hence, 
“[t]he fact that these sorts of forensic practices exist stands as a glaring example of 
the sort of failing that confrontation is designed to prevent and expose.”140  The 
National Innocence Project’s conclusions are supported by a 2008 report conducted 
by the National Academy of Science, which found that:  
Forensic evidence that has helped convict thousands of defendants for nearly a 
century is often the product of shoddy scientific practices that should be upgraded 
and standardized . . . [and] the field suffer[s] from a reliance on outmoded and 
untested theories by analysts who often have no background in science, statistics 
or other empirical disciplines.141 
Asserting that laboratory reports are not testimonial, only report objective 
facts, and fall under the business records exception, Massachusetts contends that 
they are sufficiently “reliable” to render cross-examination of the individual who 
prepared the report unnecessary.142  As the petitioner explains, “[T]hese three 
arguments are just different ways of asserting that forensic reports should be 
deemed nontestimonial because they are reliable.”143  However, the “reliability” 
standard was expressly rejected in Roberts.  Furthermore, as demonstrated by the 
National Innocence Project and the recent report conducted by the National 
Academy of Science, state laboratory forensic tests results are anything but 
reliable. 
It is certainly true that, were the Supreme Court to follow in the Law Court’s 
footsteps in classifying forensic laboratory reports as “testimonial” and, therefore, 
subject to the Confrontation Clause, the administrative burden placed on states in 
prosecuting many criminal cases would be increased.144  However, “[w]hile the 
                                                                                                     
 138. Brief of National Innocence Network, supra note 136, at 2-3.  “These are just some of the many 
exoneration cases that illustrate how forensic laboratory errors and overreaching plagued the criminal 
justice process during the past 35 years.”  Id. at 20.  See also Houston Won’t Review Cases in Lab 
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 14, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/us/14 
houston.html?emc=eta1 (reporting on the discovery of “hundreds of criminal cases believed tainted by 
problems in the [Houston] Police Department’s crime laboratory”). 
 139. Brief of National Innocence Network, supra note 136, at 4-5. 
 140. Id. at 17. 
 141. Solomon Moore, Science Found Wanting in Nation’s Crime Labs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at 
A1. 
 142. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 125, 14, 23, 30. 
 143. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 131, at 8. 
 144. In its brief in support of the respondent, the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) 
and District, Prosecuting, and County Attorneys argue that “[g]iven the limited resources in the state 
laboratories, requiring live testimony in each and every drug-related case would cause significant delays 
in the administration of justice.”  Brief of Amici Curiae the National District Attorneys Association et 
al. at 15, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) [hereinafter Brief of 
National District Attorneys Association].  The NDAA posited that “[i]f live testimony of an analyst 
were required in each and every drug case, the current criminal justice system would effectively come to 
a standstill.”  Id. at 19. 
2010] STATE V. MANGOS 321 
State’s administrative and fiscal concerns are legitimate, they cannot control the 
scope of the ‘bedrock procedural guarantee’” of the Confrontation Clause.145  
Indeed, “[t]he criminal justice system would, no doubt, be cheaper and more 
efficient . . . if the confrontation right did not exist.  So too would it be cheaper and 
more efficient if it did without juries, or lawyers, or even judges.”146  Holding 
forensic laboratory results to be “testimonial” would likely have the effect of 
rendering the results more reliable as “examiners who realize there is a possibility 
their work—or lack thereof—will be subjected to adversarial scrutiny can be 
expected to think twice before making up results and tests from scratch.”147  Were 
that the case, “[g]ood forensic practices [would] have nothing to fear in such a 
system.  Not only [would] such procedures and methods withstand even the most 
vigorous cross-examination, but the accused [would] often choose to forego 
confrontation entirely, rather than drive home in front of the fact-finder the 
accuracy and reliability of the scientific evidence against him,”148 thereby lessening 
the administrative burden. 
The development of forensic testing has made the task of prosecuting 
defendants easier for prosecutors by providing them with a means of connecting the 
defendant to the crime scene or verifying the chemical composition of illicit 
substances found in the possession or bloodstream of a defendant.  With the 
development of the forensic technologies that aid them in their prosecutions of 
criminals, the states must also bear the burden of protecting criminal defendants 
from abuse of the same.  However, as Richard D. Friedman, writing as amicus 
curiae for the petitioner acknowledges, Melendez-Diaz presents “an easy case . . . 
[b]ut . . . sometimes ‘easy cases make bad law.’”149  There is no sense in 
unnecessarily consuming the states’ resources by providing a live witness to 
present the results of forensic laboratory testing, even where the defendant does not 
challenge the results or feel he has anything to gain by cross-examining their 
preparer.150  Because “[c]onfrontation rights, like many other constitutional rights, 
can be waived,”151 defendants’ rights under the Confrontation Clause would be 
satisfied by “notice and demand” statutes that provide for confrontation of the 
laboratory technician or technicians who performed the forensic laboratory test by 
requiring “prosecutors [to] present live testimony from forensic examiners only in 
cases in which criminal defendants affirmatively choose to exercise their 
confrontation rights.”152 
                                                                                                     
 145. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, Melendez-Diaz v. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Law Court was correct in holding that forensic laboratory reports are 
testimonial and, therefore, subject to the Confrontation Clause in State v. Mangos.  
In light of the historical purpose of the Clause and of its own Confrontation Clause 
precedent, the Supreme Court should classify laboratory reports prepared in 
anticipation of litigation as “testimonial” in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.  The 
procedural protections provided by the Confrontation Clause are essential to the 
integrity of our adversarial system.  Laboratory reports are critical to prosecutors’ 
cases against criminal defendants and are damning evidence in the eyes of juries.  
Preventing defendants from cross-examining the preparers of such evidence 
deprives criminal defendants of their constitutional rights, and the Supreme Court 
is now in a position to remedy the same. 
VII.  ADDENDUM 
Consistent with this Note’s reasoning, but imposing important limitations not 
considered by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in State v. Mangos, the majority 
opinion in Melendez-Diaz, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, posited that this “case involves little more than the 
application of our holding in Crawford v. Washington.”153  Relying on the Davis 
Court’s definition of “testimonial” statements, which included affidavits, the Court 
explained that the “documents at issue [in Melendez-Diaz], while denominated by 
Massachusetts law ‘certificates,’ are quite plainly affidavits: ‘declaration[s] of facts 
written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to 
administer oaths.’”154  Again, harkening back to Davis, the Court elaborated that 
“the ‘certificates’ are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing 
‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’” 155   
The Court rejected Massachusetts’s argument that a witness’s statements must 
be “accusatory” in order to be subject to the Confrontation Clause by relying on the 
text of the Amendment, which simply guarantees a defendant’s right of 
confrontation of witnesses “against him.”156  Citing the National Academy Report, 
the Court also rejected the contention that laboratory test results are always the 
result of “neutral scientific testing.”157  The Court correctly identified the fact that 
the argument that laboratory test results are sufficiently reliable so as to not require 
confrontation “is little more than an invitation to return to [the Court’s] overruled 
decision in Roberts ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’”158  Finally, with 
regard to Massachusetts’s contention that laboratory test results are “business 
records” and therefore are subject to the traditional exception to confrontation 
afforded such documents, the Court explained that Massachusetts “misunderstands 
the relationship” between the hearsay exception for business records and the 
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Confrontation Clause.159  The Court further noted that whether or not laboratory 
results are created in the course of conducting business, they are also created for 
“the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial,” and are therefore 
testimonial.160 
The divide between the majority and dissenting opinions is essentially that of 
the formalists versus the pragmatists.  Because of its concerns about the practical 
ramifications of the majority’s opinion, the dissent offered strained arguments to 
arrive at its ultimate goal of excluding laboratory test results from the requirements 
of the Confrontation Clause.161  In an attempt to reach its desired outcome, the 
dissent essentially took issue with the Court’s precedent in Crawford, namely with 
the Court’s formulation of the category of out-of-court statements—those that are 
“testimonial”—that are subject to the Confrontation Clause.162  Despite the 
dissent’s distaste for what it viewed as the majority’s unsupported classification of 
“testimonial” statements, the dissent offered little support for its own formulation 
that the Confrontation Clause applies instead only to “conventional” witnesses.  
The dissent defined a “conventional” witness as “one who has personal knowledge 
of some aspect of the defendant’s guilt” and “one who perceived an event that gave 
rise to a personal belief in some aspect of the defendant’s guilt.”163  For the 
contention that the right to confront is limited to “conventional” witnesses, 
however, there is no support to be found in the text of the Confrontation Clause, 
which reads quite plainly that all witnesses against the defendant are subject to 
confrontation. 
The dissent was  concerned that the majority’s holding “imposes enormous 
costs on the administration of justice” and “threatens to disrupt forensic 
investigations across the country and to put prosecutions nationwide at risk of 
dismissal based on erratic, all-too-frequent instances when a particular laboratory 
technician, now invested by the Court’s new constitutional designation as the 
analyst, simply does not or cannot appear.”164  The dissent is not alone in its hand-
wringing about the majority’s holding.165  Holding steadfast to its understanding of 
the Constitutional guarantee, however, the majority maintained that “[t]he 
Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminals more burdensome, 
but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-
incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like those other constitutional 
provisions—is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.”166  
Further, the majority “doubt[ed] the accuracy of respondent’s and the dissent’s dire 
predictions.”167 Minimizing the dissent’s concerns, the majority offered that 
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“[p]erhaps the best indication that the sky will not fall after today’s decision is that 
it has not done so already.”168  In support of its position, the majority noted the ten 
states that had already adopted the constitutional rule announced in Melendez-Diaz 
and found that there was “no evidence that the criminal justice system has ground 
to a halt.”169  Of the ten states cited by the majority, Maine was not among them.170  
This is perhaps an expression by the Court that, in its estimation, the Maine Law 
Court’s holding in Mangos is overbroad. 
Although the dissent failed to offer a compelling justification for its conclusion 
that laboratory test results prepared by analysts are not subject to the Confrontation 
Clause, the dissent did identify an issue raised by Mangos: Who is the analyst?171  
As illustrated by Mangos, the Melendez-Diaz dissent pointed out that there are 
several people involved with the preparation and testing of a sample and that each 
could be considered an analyst under the majority’s analysis.172  As the dissent 
explained, each of the individuals involved with the testing “has power to introduce 
error.”173  Along those same lines, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held in 
Mangos that the individual who prepared the sample, like the individual who 
conducted the testing, was subject to confrontation.174  The Melendez-Diaz majority 
dismissed the dissent’s argument with the following reasoning: 
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion . . . we do not hold, and it is not the case, that 
anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, 
authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person 
as part of the prosecution’s case. . . .  It is up to the prosecution to decide what 
steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but what 
testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced live.175 
In responding to the dissent’s fears that Melendez-Diaz would create a 
“slippery slope” requiring the appearance of each and every laboratory employee 
involved at any stage of the testing process, the majority made a shrewd distinction, 
one not made by the Law Court in Mangos and one that should appease the 
pragmatic concerns of the dissent and catastrophizing commentators alike.  The 
Melendez-Diaz majority explained, of those involved in the preparation and testing, 
only one person provides “testimony” subject to the Confrontation Clause, the 
individual who actually conducts the test which produces the result that is to be 
introduced in court.176  
VIII.  LOOKING AHEAD 
The disagreement about Melendez-Diaz’s practical implications and the 
uncertainty about the reach of the Supreme Court’s opinion may be short lived, 
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however, in light of the Court’s grant of certiorari, subsequent to its issuance of 
Melendez-Diaz, in the case of Briscoe v. Virginia.177  Briscoe presents the 
following question:  
If a state allows a prosecutor to introduce a certificate of a forensic laboratory 
analysis, without presenting the testimony of the analyst who prepared the 
certificate, does the state avoid violating the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment by providing that the accused has a right to call the analyst as his own 
witness?178 
This question would appear to have been answered by Melendez-Diaz.  Indeed, 
the Court specifically explained that “[c]onverting the prosecution’s duty under the 
Confrontation Clause into the defendant’s privilege under state law or the 
Compulsory Process Clause shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows 
from the State to the accused.”179  “More fundamentally,” the Court continued, “the 
Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, 
not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.”180  As University 
of Michigan Law School Professor Richard D. Friedman, a Confrontation Clause 
scholar and the attorney who filed the petition for certiorari in Briscoe, reacted to 
the Court’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz on his blog:  
[There is also the] argument that the power to subpoena the analyst, either under 
the Compulsory Process Clause or a state statute, adequately fulfills the 
confrontation right.  Justice Scalia gives this argument the back of the hand that it 
deserves, dismissing it in a single paragraph–though several states had adopted it.  
And it was dangerous, too, because the principle was limitless and would have 
posed a significant threat to the continuing vitality of the Confrontation Clause.  I 
confess I was a little sorry to see this part of the opinion; my petition in Briscoe v. 
Virginia, which has been held pending this decision, had raised this issue, and I 
would have loved to argue it.  Instead, we get handed a victory without argument.  
Darn.181 
Although Professor Friedman felt that Melendez-Diaz was “the right result, for 
the right reasons,” he expressed his disappointment at what he perceived to be the 
Court’s foreclosure of the issue presented in his case.182  Apparently, though, the 
Supreme Court of the United States read the situation differently. 
One can only speculate about the Court’s reasoning for granting certiorari on 
an issue within a week of issuing an opinion that appears to have resolved that very 
issue.  What is certain, however, is that Justice Sotomayor, instead of Justice 
Souter, will be a new voice on the Court in Briscoe.  This personnel change has the 
potential to have a tremendous impact on the Court’s Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence.  As Marquette University Law School Professor Daniel D. Blinka 
explained: 
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Melendez-Diaz itself may have a short shelf-life.  Only four days after publishing 
Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a Virginia case that 
revisits this very evidentiary scenario.  Since the recently departed David Souter 
provided the fifth vote for the majority, we will soon learn how justice-soon-to-be 
Sotomayor, a former prosecutor with a liberal bent, affects the balance.183 
There is much conjecture about Sotomayor’s ideology and personal history, 
and the impact that both might have on the Court.  The Wall Street Journal 
predicted that “[w]hile Judge Sonia Sotomayor stands in the liberal mainstream on 
many issues, her record suggests that the Supreme Court nominee could sometimes 
rule with the top court's conservatives on questions of criminal justice.”184 
Commentator Lyle Dennison deemed that: 
There is, it would seem, at least a chance that [Souter’s] designated successor, 
Judge Sotomayor, would not be prepared to embrace Melendez-Diaz, at least 
without some restriction on its scope; she has a record on criminal law issues that 
appears to be somewhat more prosecution-oriented than Justice Souter’s has 
been.185 
Similarly, Case Western Reserve University School of Law Professor Jonathan 
Adler blogged that: 
[T]here are reasons to suspect that she may join the pragmatists more often than 
the formalists.  For one thing, her criminal law opinions provide little evidence of 
a strong civil libertarian streak of the sort that would lead her to apply 
constitutional protections for criminal defendants in a strict and unyielding 
manner.  Further, her experience as a trial court judge and prosecutor may lead her 
to take a more pragmatic, and less bright-line-oriented approach to these sorts of 
cases.  If so, her ascension to the Court could have dramatic consequences for 
criminal law, as she could create a new Court majority on these issues and roll 
back recent decisions on the Confrontation Clause, sentencing rules, and other 
areas of criminal law.186 
The impact that Judge Sotomayor and the Court’s decision in Briscoe will 
have on Melendez-Diaz remains to be seen.  At this point, the only certainty is that 
there is uncertainty in the Court’s position on laboratory results and the 
Confrontation Clause.  As it stands now, however, Melendez-Diaz is, in the words 
of Richard Friedman, “the right result for the right reason,”187 granting criminal 
defendants the right to confront those individuals responsible for what amounts to 
the “testimonial statement” of the results of laboratory testing. 
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